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Connelly: The Alien Tort Statute: “An Avant-Garde Tool for Human Rights” or

THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: “AN AVANT-GARDE TOOL FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS” OR A CAMOFLAGED CURSE?
Candra Connelly

I. INTRODUCTION
The Alien Tort Statute1 (“ATS”) was enacted into federal law in 1789
and confers courts of federal jurisdiction the ability to hear lawsuits filed
by non-US citizens for torts committed in violation of international law:2
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States.”3 Prior to the enactment of ATS, “a
nation became responsible under the law of nations for injuries that its
citizens inflicted on aliens if it failed to provide adequate means of
redress . . . .”4 Over the last half-century, claims brought under the ATS
have involved violations of international law stemming from murder and
torture to the funding of international terror regimes. 5 However, what
was meant to provide aliens with redress has, over the last decade or so,
left everyone questioning the power of the Act and the correct method of
its application. Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root is the latest case that
has left the legal community scratching its head as it absorbs the Fifth
Circuit’s decision on how to apply the ATS.6 In the Fifth Circuit’s
January 2017 decision, the court outright rejected the Fourth Circuit’s
analysis in Al Shimari v. CACI Premium Tech., Inc.7 when it came to the
statute’s extraterritorial application and these two circuits are not the
only ones at odds when it comes to a permissible application.8
The Alien Tort Statute has already had its day in the Supreme Court,
but it looks as if the Court may be seeing it again shortly, as circuit
courts around the country look to the Supreme Court for clarification.
This article will address the most recent circuit split, considering the
1. The Alien Tort Statute, THE CTR. FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY (2016), http://cja.org/whatwe-do/litigation/legal-strategy/the-alien-tort-statute/.
2. Id.
3. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1948).
4. Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78
U. Chi. L. Rev. 445, 450 (2011).
5. See Sosa v. Alvarez- Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). See also Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770
F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court addressed ATS claims for the first time in Sosa, when a
Mexican national brought an ATS claim after DEA agents had kidnapped him in Mexico and brought
him to the U.S. to stand trial for the murder of a DEA agent.
6. 845 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 2017).
7. 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014).
8. Numerous other circuits are also conflicted when it comes to applying aspects of case law to
ATS claims.
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Fifth and Fourth Circuit’s extraterritorial applications of the ATS. It will
conclude that the Fourth Circuit has the more viable interpretation of the
statute itself, and ultimately state what the test should look like going
forward. Part II of this article will provide background knowledge of the
cases that have stumped the circuits in this jurisdictional application
process. Part III will address the issues, break down the best possible
application of the statute and its extraterritorial component, and provide
insight into what an application of the ATS may look like going
forward. Lastly part IV will provide closing thoughts regarding what we
may see shortly from the Supreme Court.
II. BACKGROUND
A. ATS and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Enacted in 1789, the general connotation was that the Alien Tort
Statute would serve as a jurisdictional bridge for non-US citizens to
bring a cause of action against those residing in the U.S. who violated
various aspects of international law, specifically involving implications
of human rights.9 Under the ATS, for a cause of action to be viable
against an individual, that individual must live in or frequently visit the
U.S.10 This ATS requirement cannot be deduced from the statute, but it
has been applied in over a decade’s worth of common law, and is not
usually a topic of discussion in an ATS case because it is not typically
disputed.
The ATS was a generally unnoticed and underutilized portion of
federal law until around 1980, when a Paraguayan doctor and his
daughter filed suit under the ATS against a former Paraguayan police
officer living in New York City.11 The suit was for allegedly kidnapping
and torturing members of their family in retaliation for their family’s
opposition to the Paraguayan government.12 The Second Circuit
ultimately observed that torture violates international law and thus a
valid claim existed for these facts under the ATS.13
From the moment that the Second Circuit enunciated the types of
claims viable under the ATS, plaintiffs began to place an increased
sense of reliance on the statute, especially when it came to seeking
9. The Alien Tort Statute, supra note 1.
10. Id.
11. Filartiga v. Peña- Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980)
12. Amy Howe, An Introduction to the Alien Tort Statute and corporate liability: In Plain
English, SCOTUS blog (July 24, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/introduction-alien-tortstatute-corporate-liability-plain-english/. See Filartiga v. Peña- Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980).
13. Id.
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redress from human rights violations occurring overseas. Judge Henry
Friendly went on to describe the ATS as a “‘kind of legal Lohengrin,’
after a mythical German knight who arrives in a boat pulled by swans,
because ‘no one seems to know whence it came.’”14
After numerous successful cases were brought under the ATS, many
of which resulted from conduct occurring overseas, defendants began to
push back. Chief Justice John Roberts referred to plaintiffs evoking the
ATS as attempting to make the U.S. the “‘moral custodian’ of the
world.”15 As a result of this analogy, in 2004 the Supreme Court
indicated that the kinds of claims that were to be viable under the ATS
going forward were to be relatively limited.16 While the ATS was
originally used to remedy international wrongs, the Supreme Court
further clarified that the ATS is only a statute that confers jurisdiction to
federal courts to hear cases alleging international human rights violation
and that it is not a tool that provides a cause of action for specific
alleged wrongdoings.17
i. Going Forward
Along with the Court’s interpretation that the ATS only provides
jurisdiction for claims to be brought in U.S. federal courts, a test to
whether those claims should go forward was also enunciated. It was
found that ATS claims should only proceed if they are widely accepted
as violations of international norms or violations of international law
that are paradigms to causes of action that existed under international
law18 at the time of ATS’s enactment.19
“[T]he determination whether a norm is sufficiently definite [or a
widely accepted violation of international law] to support a cause of
action . . . involve[s] an element of judgment about what the practical
consequences of ‘allowing litigants to rely on that norm’” are.20 When it
comes to deciding whether a violation is a paradigm to a cause of action
that existed at ATS enactment, a court should be in tune with the norm
and what remedy that cause of action provides.21

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720.
17. Howe, supra note 12.
18. Violation of safe conducts, infringement of rights of ambassadors, and piracy. See Sosa, 542
U.S. at 715.
19. Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 525.
20. Howe, supra note 12.
21. Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

3

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 6

206

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

ii. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
The presumption that a statute does not have an extraterritorial
application is a “longstanding principal of American law ‘that
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’”22
This idea is based upon the notion that “Congress ordinarily legislates
with respect to domestic, not foreign matters.”23 In other words, if a
statute is to be applied extraterritorially, Congress must give clear
indication that the specific statute is intended to have an extraterritorial
reach.
The purpose of the presumption is that it “serves to protect against
unintended clashes between our laws and those of nations which could
result in international discord.”24 While the stated purpose may seem
legitimate, case law suggests that not all exceptions are clear,
specifically regarding statutes enacted by Congress that reference
international matters and conduct. The presumption against
extraterritoriality has been at the core of numerous landmark Supreme
Court decisions within the twenty-first century and is crucial to a correct
application of the ATS.25
iii. An Extraterritorial Debate
The Supreme Court has been asked numerous times in the last decade
to provide a viable, non-ambiguous interpretation of the ATS’s
extraterritorial application. Other statutes that implicate questions of
international law have had the same difficulty in finding a correct test to
ensure that the statute applies extraterritorially. 26 Adhikari’s outright
rejection of Al Shimari’s application of the ATS is the perfect example
to indicate that the Supreme Court has yet to enunciate a bright line
application of the rule.

22. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
23. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). See also Smith v. United
States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993).
24. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (quoting EEOC, 499 U.S. at 248
(1991)).
25. See generally Morrison, 561 U.S. 247 (2010); Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108 (2013); RJR Nabisco v.
European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
26. See §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and portions of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act.
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a. Morrison v. Nat’l Aust. Bank Ltd.:27 the Supreme Court’s Initial
Guidance on the Presumption
In 1998, National Australian Bank (“National”) acquired Homeside
Lending, Inc., an American Company.28 Three years later, National
announced that it would incur a $450 million write-down for
inaccurately calculating the fees that Homeside would generate for
servicing mortgages.29 As a result of the write-down, stock prices
dropped.30 Later the same year, National again announced that they had
inaccurately calculated, this time leading to a $1.75 billion write-down
and a further drop in stock price.31 This lawsuit was brought as result of
that loss by three plaintiffs representing a class of non-American
purchasers of National stock.32
The district court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
the non-American purchasers because the acts that occurred in the U.S.
were “at most, a link in the chain of an alleged overall securities fraud
scheme that culminated abroad.”33 The Second Circuit affirmed the
finding that the acts performed in the U.S. did not “‘compris[e] the heart
of the alleged fraud.’”34 In other words, if the fraud itself had occurred
in the U.S., rather than just the plan to carry out the acts, and those acts
were the specific acts leading to losses for foreign investors, proper
jurisdiction may have existed. “[T]he focus of the [Securities] Exchange
Act [of 1934] is not upon the place where the deception originated, but
upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States.”35 With this
particular set of facts, the court concluded that the issuance of fraudulent
statements from National’s headquarters in Australia were more central
to the fraud than the manipulation of the financial statements in the U.S.,
thus the focus of the statute and the location where the conduct occurred
never intersected, failing to displace the presumption.36
On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court noted that the question to
be decided was “whether §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
provided a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing for misconduct in

27. 561 U.S. 247.
28. Id. at 251.
29. Id. at 252.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 253.
33. Morrsion, 561 U.S. at 253 (quoting In re National Australia Bank Securities Litig., No. 03
Civ. 6537 (BSJ), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94162 at *8 (Oct. 25, 2006)).
34. Id., (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167 (2d. Cir. 2008)).
35. Id. at 266.
36. Id. at 268-73.
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connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.”37
The Supreme Court found that the Second Circuit had exercised the
presumption against extraterritoriality from the jurisprudence of §10(b)
and replaced it with the inquiry as to whether it would be reasonable 38 to
apply a statute to different factual scenarios.39 Essentially the Second
Circuit had established two tests: the “effects test” of whether the
wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the U.S. or upon U.S.
citizens; and the “conduct test” of whether the wrongful conduct
occurred in the U.S. The Second Circuit explained that these two tests
should not separate from one another on the ground that a combination
of the two gives a better picture as to whether there is sufficient U.S.
involvement to justify jurisdiction.40
The main issue with the Second Circuit’s long time and widely
accepted test is that it can be interpreted to mean that Congressional
silence leaves this issue open to interpretation by courts or that Congress
was satisfied with this interpretation.41 This line of thinking, while
allowing courts to construe statutes liberally, could also provide many
detrimental effects. In response, the Supreme Court found that “rather
than guess anew in each case, we apply the presumption in all cases,
preserving a stable background against which Congress can legislate
with predictable effects.”42 In this situation, §10(b) contained nothing to
suggest that an extraterritorial application was applicable, and thus the
court would not infer it.43 The Supreme Court further announced the
creation of a transactional test, applicable to defining the reach of §10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act.44 Under this test, the provision would
only extend to “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges .
. . and domestic transactions in other securities,” thereby confining the
reach to the statutory text.45 While the transactional test was to cover
§10(b) matters, the Court adopted the “focus” test as the method of
establishing whether there was an extraterritorial application.
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens claimed the majority
“impermissibly narrowed the inquiry in evaluating whether the statute
applies abroad.”46 He insisted that the Second Circuit refined its tests
overtime, with tacit approval from Congress, the Commissioner, and
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 250-51.
and therefore, exemplifying Congressional intent.
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257.
Id. at 257-58.
Id. at 261.
Id.
Id. at 262.
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 274.
Id.
Id. at 265 (J. Stevens concurring).
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sister circuits, and that “‘[t]he longstanding acceptance by the courts,
coupled with Congress’ failure to reject [its] reasonable interpretation of
the workings of §10(b) . . . argues significantly in favor of acceptance of
the [Second Circuit] rule by this court.’”47 He argued that the majority
sought to transfer the presumption from a flexible rule to a clear
statement of law and that simply is not a correct application.48
b. Adding to Extraterritoriality: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro Co.49
In 2013, the Supreme Court took Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co.
under advisement after the Second Circuit dismissed the complaint
based on an assumption that corporations cannot be held liable under the
ATS because “the law of nations does not recognize corporate
liability.”50 In Kiobel, Nigerian nationals sued Dutch, British, and
Nigerian corporations, alleging that they aided and abetted the Nigerian
military in committing international law violations. Specifically,
petitioners argued that they, or their relatives, were killed, tortured,
unlawfully detained, deprived of their property, and forced into exile by
the Nigerian government, and that the respondents were complicit in
these acts of violence and international injustice.51 The Supreme Court
agreed to issue a writ of certiorari; not to decide whether corporations
were susceptible to ATS claims, but instead to decide whether claims
consisting of conduct that primarily occurred abroad can be brought
under the statute.52
In Chief Justice Robert’s opinion, he found “that the principals
underlying the general presumption that U.S. law does not apply outside
of the United States extend[s] fully to the ATS.” 53 In making this
statement, the Chief Justice reinforced the principal that statutes
ordinarily do not apply extraterritorially without explicit Congressional
intent. While concluding that the presumption against extraterritoriality
barred this specific ATS claim because all relevant conduct took place
outside of the U.S., the court stated that even if the claims were to
“touch and concern” the U.S. with sufficient force, the mere presence of
a corporation was not sufficient to overcome the threshold.54 The court

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 278 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 (1975)).
Id.
Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
Id. at 114.
Id. at 113-14.
Howe, supra note 12.
Id.
Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 125.
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thus created an exception55 by enunciating that ATS can create
jurisdiction when “claims touch and concern56 the territory of the United
States . . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application.”57 While articulating the exception, the court
failed to provide a workable way for the lower courts to apply this
“test.”58
c. A Final Take? RJR Nabisco v. European Cmty.59
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel left the legal community
wondering which test governs the extraterritorial analysis, the “focus”
test60 or the “touch and concern” test.61 The Supreme Court stated in
RJR Nabisco that “. . . for ATS claims, ‘[i]f the conduct relevant to the
statute’s [ATS’s] focus occurred in the United States, then the case
involves a permissible domestic application even if other conduct
occurred abroad.”62 In other words, if the relevant conduct63 occurred in
a foreign country, the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial
application, regardless of conduct that occurred in the U.S., ultimately
resulting in a claim that is categorically barred.64 The relevant conduct
must intersect with the focus of the statute in question for there to be a
cognizable extraterritorial application of the statute without an explicit
showing of Congressional intent. Meaning, the “focus” test and the
“touch and concern” test are, for ATS extraterritorial purposes, the same
test.65
The European Community66 and twenty-six of its member states
originally brought suit against RJR Nabisco (RJR) in the Eastern District
of New York in 2000,67 alleging that RJR directed, managed, and
controlled a global money laundering enterprise in violation of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) statute.68
55. Id. at 124-25.
56. Becomes known in future cases as the “touch and concern” language.
57. 569 U.S. at 124-25.
58. The “touch and concern” language is a key point in many extraterritorial analyses.
59. 136 S. Ct. 2090.
60. As enunciated in Morrison.
61. As stated in Kiobel.
62. 136 S.Ct. at 2101.
63. Relevant conduct is conduct that occurred in violation of part of some international law.
64. 136 S. Ct. at 2101.
65. Clarifying Kiobel’s “Touch and Concern Test”, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1902, 1911-12 (2017).
66. Formally the European Economic Community (”EEC”), a regional organization aimed at
bringing about economic integration in its member states. EEC was renamed European Community
upon the formation of the European Union and is not incorporated.
67. 136 S. Ct. at 2098.
68. Id.
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This violation allegedly occurred as a result of Columbian and Russian
criminal organizations importing illegal drugs into European countries,
selling them, and laundering money back to the organizations’ home
countries.69 The money from selling the illegal drugs was then used to
pay for large shipments of RJR cigarettes to Europe.70
The district court dismissed the action based on the presumption
against extraterritoriality.71 The Second Circuit reversed and held that
claims under RICO can apply extraterritorially when a RICO claim is in
violation of a predicate statute that Congress clearly intended to have an
extraterritorial application.72
Justice Alito stated that sections of RICO have an extraterritorial
application to rebut the presumption, which is expressed by clear
indication from Congress in predicate statutes.73 Sections of the RICO
text specifically define certain racketeering offenses as ones that occur
outside of the U.S., thereby displacing the presumption.74 However,
according to the Court, not all foreign enterprises qualify to rebut the
presumption in these instances.75 The enterprise must directly affect
commerce involving the U.S. in order for this part of RICO to apply. 76 If
RICO does apply, in order for the lawsuit to proceed, a plaintiff must
allege domestic injury.77 In this case, all alleged injuries by plaintiffs
were suffered abroad and thus the Court found that the district court
correctly dismissed the case.78 While an impermissible application of
ATS was found in this case, RJR provided the Supreme Court with an
opportunity to clarify what exactly the test is for conducting an
extraterritorial analysis and provided an opportunity to reiterate that
Morrison’s focus test still governs.79
Accordingly, the Court stated that in evaluating whether a claim
involves a permissible extraterritorial application, a court must first look
at whether the presumption has been rebutted by clear and affirmative
indication80 that the statute applies extraterritorially, and second, if there

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2099.
72. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2102.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2101.
75. Id. at 2105.
76. Id. at 2094.
77. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2095.
78. Id. at 2111.
79. Perlette Jura & Dylan Mefford, Extraterritoriality: The ATS in Focus, LAW360 (Oct. 25,
2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/855264/extraterritoriality-the-ats-in-focus.
80. Clear and affirmative evidence could be direct, written authorization with the statute,
authorizing an extraterritorial application.
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is no such indication, a court must ask whether the claim involves a
domestic application of the statute’s focus.81 Essentially, if the conduct
that is relevant to the statute’s focus occurs on U.S. soil, an allowable
domestic application of the statute exists, even if other conduct occurred
abroad. Alternatively, if all of the conduct occurred abroad, a court does
not even have to consider the statute’s focus before dismissing the
case.82
B. No Clear Consensus: Recent Split Over Extraterritorial Application
of ATS
i. Al Shimari v. CACI Premium Technology
The Fourth Circuit has heard this case four times since 200883 and
there is no indication that a final decision is forthcoming, without an
eventual ruling from the Supreme Court.84 Originally filed in 2008, the
Center for Constitutional Rights brought suit on behalf of four Iraqi
torture victims against CACI International Inc. and CACI Premium
Technology, two U.S. based government contractors.85 The complaint
alleged that the defendants’ directed and participated in illegal conduct,
including torture, at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, where they were
hired by the U.S. to provide interrogation services.86 Numerous issues
arose during this case, including issues of proper jurisdiction and
questions of justiciability.87 While originally dismissed on remand after
the release of the Kiobel decision, due to all incidents alleged occurring
in Iraq, dismissal was later overturned.88
On the Fourth Circuit’s third hearing of the case,89 it interpreted that
the Supreme Court’s broadly stated usage of the word “claims”90
allowed the court jurisdiction.91 It interpreted the word “claim” to have
the meaning given by Black’s Law Dictionary, as the “aggregate of

81. Jura, supra note 80.
82. Id.
83. 658 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2011); 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012); 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014);
840 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 2016).
84. Most recently, the defense filed a renewed motion to dismiss, which was denied from the
bench on September 22, 2017.
85. Al Shimari v. CACI et al., CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Sept. 26, 2017),
https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/al-shimari-v-caci-et-al.
86. 658 F.3d at 415-417.
87. See all 4 of the Fourth Circuit opinions in this case [listed above].
88. 758 F.3d at 520.
89. Id. at 516.
90. As discussed in Kiobel.
91. 758 F.3d at 527.
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operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court.”92 Under this
rationale, the broad definition of the word “‘claims,’ rather than the
alleged tortious conduct, must touch and concern United States territory
with sufficient force,” suggesting that in application, courts must
consider all facts that give rise to an ATS claim, including the parties’
identities and their relationship to the cause of action. 93 In essence, this
court read the “touch and concern” language to contemplate a fact-based
analysis to determine whether particular ATS claims displace the
presumption.94
In his Kiobel concurrence, Justice Breyer stated that this particular
reading would allow for jurisdiction for torts occurring on American
soil, when the defendant is an American national, or if the defendant’s
conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American
interest.95 This particular set of examples was likely used as part of the
Fourth Circuit’s consideration when determining how broad the test
should be and how far it should stretch its interpretation of the word
“claims.”
The presumption against extraterritoriality, under this court’s
analysis, is not a categorical bar, but a fact-based analysis to determine
whether courts may exercise jurisdiction over ATS claims.96 Under
these circumstances, the plaintiffs’ claims were found to “touch and
concern” the U.S. with sufficient force to displace the presumption
against an extraterritorial application of ATS.97 “The plaintiffs’ claims
reflected extensive ‘relevant conduct’ in the U.S., contrasted to the
‘mere presence’ of foreign corporations, that was insufficient to confer
jurisdiction in Kiobel” because all relevant conduct occurred abroad.98
The torture committed in this instance was by U.S. citizens, whom were
employed by a U.S. corporation, and the torture alleged occurred at a
military base, operated by U.S. personnel.99 Allegations further insisted
that CACI managers in the U.S. gave at least tacit approval to the acts of
torture, attempted to cover it up, and implicitly encouraged the
conduct.100 The Fourth Circuit further found that Congress, through
enactment of numerous other statutes, attempted to provide aliens with
access to U.S. courts in order to hold U.S. citizens accountable for acts

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 281 (9th ed. 2009)).
Id.
Id.
133 U.S. at 127 (J. Breyer concurring).
Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 527.
Id.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 528-31.
Id. at 530-31.
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committed abroad.101
On the latest remand, it was supposed to be determined whether or
not this case presented a nonjusticiable political question102 because of
potential entanglement between the judicial and executive branches.103
The district court concluded that because a nonjusticiable political
question was inherent in this case, due to the military’s direct control
over interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib, the adjudication of the
plaintiffs’ claims required the court to improperly question sensitive
military judgments. As a result, “the court lacked any judicially
manageable standards to resolve the plaintiff’s claims.”104 Again on
appeal, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred when it
failed to determine whether the military actually exercised control over
any of CACI’s conduct alleged in the complaint.105 The conduct by
CACI employees that was unlawful when committed was found by the
Fourth Circuit to be justiciable, regardless of whether that conduct
occurred under military control.106 Furthermore, “the fact that a military
contractor was acting pursuant to ‘orders of the military does not, in and
of itself, insulate the claim from judicial review.’”107
ii. Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root108
On January 3, 2017, the Fifth Circuit released the Adhikari decision,
stating that the claims asserted against a U.S. defense contractor, for
injuries incurred on Iraqi soil, were not cognizable under ATS because
they were barred by the presumption against extraterritoriality.109 The
complaint alleged that twelve Nepali men were kidnapped and murdered
by Iraqi insurgents while traveling through Iraq to work for a
subcontractor on a U.S. government contract with Kellogg Brown &
Root (KBR).110 The decedents’ survivors brought suit against KBR for
human rights violations under the ATS, Trafficking Victims Protections,
and Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), alleging that KBR had been

101. Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530-31.
102. While there is an inherent question as to whether ATS claims can and do present an issue of
justiciability, that issue is well beyond the purview of this paper.
103. 840 F.3d at 151.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 758 F.3d at 533.
108. 845 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 2017).
109. Steptoe & Johnson LLP, “Fifth Circuit Rules on Extraterritoriality of ATS Claims, Creating
Circuit Split,” Lexology (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2fedb2e3-a8bc4b11-a8a2-b7e14aa2423b.
110. 845 F.3d at 190-91.
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involved in a human trafficking scheme that forced the decedents into
Iraq where they were later murdered.111 The district court originally
granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the
presumption barred plaintiff’s claims.112
On appeal, plaintiffs argued that Kiobel’s “touch and concern”
language permitted their claims because the contract in question was
issued and directed from the U.S., as well as supported by the U.S.
military.113 In making these claims, plaintiffs relied on the Fourth
Circuit’s 2014 decision in Al Shimari.114 The Fifth Circuit disagreed
with plaintiffs’ reading of the statute, holding that Kiobel’s
extraterritorial application and the “touch and concern” language
required courts to analyze the “focus” of the statute at issue. 115 If the
conduct that the complaint alleged had a direct relation to the statute,
then the statute may have an extraterritorial application.116 The Court
moved on to pinpoint the focus of the ATS and determined that “the
focus is conduct that violates international law.”117 The conduct alleged
in the complaint that violated international law occurred in Iraq and thus
the presumption barred jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that a U.S.
government contractor was involved and personnel in the U.S. were
aware of this trafficking scheme.
By reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit enunciated its
interpretation on the statute’s presumption against extraterritoriality.
First, the court must look at whether the presumption has been
rebutted.118 For these situations, rebutted means that there has been
clear, affirmative indication that a statute applies extraterritorially. If no
clear, affirmative indication of extraterritorial application exists, the
court must look to the statute’s focus.119 Step two’s “focus” inquiry
stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison. “[W]hether the
presumption bars a claim is not always ‘self-evidently dispositive’
because cases will often have at least some ‘contact with the territory of
the United States.’”120 For that reason, the inquiry cannot stop at step
one. The Fifth Circuit’s extraterritorial application therefore aligns with
the Supreme Court’s RJR test.121
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 190.
Id.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 199.
Adhikari, 840 F.3d at 199- 200.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 192.
Id.
Adhikari, 840 F.3d at 192.
Id.
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The Fifth Circuit enunciated the previously spoken rule that the ATS
conveys jurisdiction for a “modest number of international law
violations” that are carved out of federal common law. 122 In order for an
ATS claim “to be cognizable, a plaintiff’s claim must be stated ‘with the
requisite definite content and acceptance among civilized nations.’”123
The Fifth Circuit’s adoption of this ATS approach completely
contradicts the approach that the Fourth Circuit adopted in Al Shimari.
The Fifth Circuit observed that the Fourth Circuit considered that “the
claims,” rather than the alleged tortious conduct, must “touch and
concern” the U.S. with sufficient force.124 This approach suggests that
courts must consider all facts that give rise to an ATS claim.125 The
plaintiffs urged that a fact-specific analysis that looks at the “totality of
[their] claim’s connection to the U.S. territory and the national interest”
is necessary under Kiobel.126 Plaintiffs also sought leave to amend their
complaint in order to assert aiding and abetting claiming, in attempt to
satisfy Al Shimari, but the court denied their request to amend, stating
that Al Shimari is not the test.127 The Fifth Circuit sided with KBR in
determining that Morrison’s “focus test” still governs an ATS claims
extraterritorial application and that no evidence was presented here to
rebut the presumption.128
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Approach as a More Viable Interpretation
As first stated above, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits are completely at
odds when it comes to a correct application of the ATS’s extraterritorial
component. With no legislative history to suggest which circuit’s
interpretation should control,129 the decision to give one interpretation
more creditability over the other has essentially come down to a process
of deduction and potentially even preference.
When evaluating an ATS issue and viability of a claim, courts appear
to often be stuck on what exactly is sufficient to displace the
presumption and courts even seem confused as to whether the “focus”
122. Id. (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 794).
123. Id. (quoting Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1663).
124. Id. at 193.
125. Adhikari, 840 F.3d at 194.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 199.
128. Id. at 194.
129. Daniel Rubin, Student Project: Aline Tort Statute: Legislative History: Home, Pace Law
School
Library
Research
Guides
(Oct.
29,
2017),
http://libraryguides.law.pace.edu/c.php?g=452982&p=3107679.
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test, “touch and concern” test, a combination of the two, or neither
controls. The Morrison court used the congressional focus of a statute as
the sole test, but that test was communicated differently in Kiobel.130
The Fifth Circuit in Adhikari adopted the “focus” test as a two-part
method of analyzing ATS claims, as adopted by the Supreme Court in
RJR, eventually concluding that the focus of the ATS and the conduct
that occurs in the U.S. must correlate. If the focus and the conduct
intersect, a claim is sufficient to “touch and concern” the U.S. with
sufficient force to displace the presumption and the ATS claim may
proceed. The Fifth Circuit’s Adhikari decision is a complete
contradiction to the Fourth Circuit’s determination that the focus of the
state is only one of the many factors that should be analyzed when
determining whether an ATS claim may proceed in a U.S. federal court.
The Fourth Circuit’s adoption of a multi-factor test131 should govern
all current and future ATS analyses because it more closely resembles a
textual reading of the statute and it stays true to the statute’s intended
purpose. The purpose, which has been stated time and time again, is to
provide a method of redress for those that have been the victims of
violations of the laws of nations. Nowhere does the statute read that the
conduct must take place in the U.S. In fact, that line of reasoning would
leave many victims without a remedy and would thus go directly against
the statutes stated purpose.
A purely textual reading of the statute requires only “three elements
to be present: (1) a claim must be made by aliens; (2) it must be a tort;
and (3) the tort must be in violation of the law of nations or treaties of
the U.S.”132 Many courts have inferred that the presumption bars a claim
if conduct occurred overseas from: (1) the language of the statute; (2)
Congress’ job to legislate domestically; (3) their ability to write into
legislation that statute applies extraterritorially; and (4) their failure to
do so in the ATS. This is an incorrect reading because Congress, in
1789, chose to write this statute with broad language and more recently,
the Supreme Court in Kiobel, chose to use the word “claims” instead of
using “tortious conduct.”
It is also likely that Congress did not specify an extraterritorial
application of ATS within the statute because it did not think that it had
to. The mention of the law of nations should be sufficient to infer an
extraterritorial application. In fact, Justice Breyer133 would allow
130.
Kiobel.
131.
option.
132.
133.

Described as the focus test in Morrison but referred to as the touch and concern test in
Although they never do state that factors to be considered, only that the focus is one viable
Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 548 (1981).
In his Kiobel concurrence, joined by Justice’s Ginsberg, Sotomayer, and Kagan.
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jurisdiction whenever: (1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil; (2)
when the defendant is an American national; or (3) when the
defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an important
American national interest.134 While Kiobel disallows jurisdiction on the
ground that mere corporate presence is allegedly not sufficient to bring
an ATS claim, any direction or call made by a U.S. corporation on U.S.
soil should suffice to kick-start a cause of action under the ATS. The
literal meaning of “touch and concern” implies that each of these three
scenarios is enough to displace the presumption. If Congress intended
the focus of a statute or the claims made to “touch and concern” the U.S.
with sufficient force to displace the presumption, they would have either
written the statute more narrowly, or provided legislative history to
indicate that is how the ATS is meant to be applied.
The presumption against extraterritoriality can be described as a
rather recent canon of statutory interpretation. It was born into civil
procedure in the 1909 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. case,
when the court stated, “[a]ll legislation is prima facie territorial.”135 It is
probable that the Supreme Court was unaware of what a discord those
six words of dicta would cause over a century later. Even though it has
been over one hundred years since the first discussion of the
presumption, it can still be said to be a relatively recent phenomenon
due to the relatively slow progression of the legal system.
The Supreme Court has no business applying this relatively recent
phenomenon to statute that existed almost a century and a half before it.
In other words, it is inappropriate to apply a canon of statutory
construction, born in 1909, to a statute that has been in existence since
1789. The argument that if Congress intended the statute to apply
extraterritorially, they would have explicitly included it, becomes
essentially illegitimate when considering that members of Congress,
who wrote the ATS, were unaware of how the legal system would
interpret this statute centuries later. It is only fair to interpret the ATS as
having an extraterritorial aspect because it mentions, on its face, the law
of nations. That alone should be enough to indicate that those in 1789
meant for it to apply extraterritorially. Going against the statutes stated
purpose and its textual reading, both in existence of centuries, to apply a
canon of construction that did not come into existence until over one
hundred years later, a canon that effectively has to the power to negate
the statute, is an improper interpretation of the law.
By reading the presumption into each and every statute that Congress
does not specifically state applies abroad, the court is creating too many

134. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 127.
135. 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
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bright line rules that may often go against the exact purpose of a statute.
Furthermore, stating that the focus of the statute is the sole consideration
in determining whether the presumption is displaced, makes the line
even brighter. This cannot be a correct application because a statute can
be read to have many foci. Then, the issue becomes: which focus
governs? When determining the answer, legislative history should
indicate the priority of a statute’s adoption. When that is not available, it
is inappropriate to allude to a narrow application, something which both
the Supreme Court and numerous circuit courts have done in the past.
The Supreme Court, in its three most recent cases addressing a
statute’s extraterritorial application, contradicts itself numerous times
when it discusses explicit displacement of the presumption and the
conduct and focus of a statute. Dissenting in part in Adhikari, Judge
Graves stated:
“[t]he majority then reasons that the ‘ATS “focus” analysis’
involves examining “the conduct alleged to constitute violations
of the law of nations, and the location of that conduct.”136I have
no issue with this broad proposition; however, it is not simple
matter to apply it to a case, such as this one, where the alleged
conduct is comprised of several constituent actions that are part
of an overall course of conduct constituting a violation of the law
of nations.”137
If the court only looks to one factor, its determined “focus” of a
statute, it is doing a disservice to those seeking to utilize the statute to
remedy an international wrong. By looking only at what it declares the
“focus” to be, and thus likely only look at one specific act, the court is
turning a blind eye to all other claims in front of it, all of which are
likely stemming from multiple and potentially even separate events.
In his Morrison concurrence, Justice Breyer stated that with the ATS
language adopted, “Congress invited an expansive role for judicial
elaboration when it crafted such an open-ended statute in 1934.”138
While Justice Breyer concurred in judgment, he disagreed with the
majorities turning of the presumption from a flexible rule into more of a
clear statement of law.139 In his discussion of the presumption, he
referenced EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco),140 where
Justice Rehnquist stated “Congress’ awareness of the need to make a
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 208 (quoting Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 185).
Id.
561 U.S. at 276.
Id. at 278.
EEOC, 499 U.S. 244 at 258.
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clear statement that a statute applies overseas is amply demonstrated by
the numerous occasions on which it has expressly legislated the
extraterritorial application of the statute.”141 Justice Marshall vigorously
disagreed with that statement, arguing that “ . . . this canon is not a
‘clear statement’ rule, the application of which relieves a court of the
duty to give effect to all available indicia of the legislative will.”142
From Aramco, Justice Breyer deduces that “ . . . our cases both before
and after Aramco make perfectly clear that the Court continues to give
effect to ‘all available evidence about the meaning’ of a provision when
considering its extraterritorial application, lest we defy congress’
will.”143 He concludes that the presumption can be useful as a theory of
congressional purpose, a tool for managing international conflict, a
background norm, a tiebreaker, but it does NOT relieve courts of the
duty to give statutes the most faithful reading possible.144 This statement
indicates that he believes the presumption to be one of many pieces in
analyzing extraterritorial applicability. While Congress’ purpose is to
legislate domestically, that should not be a sole or even a strong reason
for concluding that the ATS does not apply extraterritorially, especially
where there is explicit mention of international law within the statutory
text, and absolutely no mention or indication that the statute does not
apply to conduct that has taken place out of the U.S. Reading “the law of
nations” to apply only to activity occurring inside of the U.S. is, in itself,
contradictory.
B. The Lone Dissenter
Judge Graves dissent145 in Adhikari touches on numerous factors that
point to why a bright line rule regarding the ATS needs to be
established. Graves believes that the majority “adopts an unnecessarily
restrictive view as to the meaning of Kiobel’s ‘touch and concern’
language by engaging in a formalistic application of Morrison’s focus
test.”146 He believes that the plaintiffs stated a cause of action, with
claims that “touch and concern” the U.S. with sufficient force, thus
allowing a for viable ATS claim to be brought.147 The alleged violations
related specifically to conduct being directed from the U.S., attempts to

141. 561 U.S. at 278.
142. Id. at 279.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 280.
145. Judge Graves dissented in part, concurred in part. His concurrence was only in relation to
non-ATS claims.
146. 845 F.3d at 208 (J. Graves dissent).
147. Id.
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U.S. personnel to cover that conduct up, and also allegations that the
defendant and other U.S. corporations were directly benefiting from the
international law violations.148 He further goes on to state that “the
majority’s application of the ‘focus’ test belies the actual focus of the
ATS and is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s ATS
jurisprudence.”149
Judge Graves’ recitation that the Fifth Circuit’s application the ATS,
both generally and extraterritorially, belies what the statute was meant to
accomplish in 1789, is refreshing. While voicing that he thinks the
majority got it wrong, he perhaps takes his analysis too far by stating
that the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in “inconsistent with the Supreme
Court’s ATS jurisprudence.” It is difficult for the Fifth Circuit’s entire
ATS opinion to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court, when the
Supreme Court itself has contradicted itself numerous times over the last
decade, each new opinion adding a layer to the ATS analysis that does
not always make logical sense. However, while Judge Graves may have
exaggerated a bit, he correctly states that the Fifth Circuit got its
analysis wrong, specifically when it decided whether the claims stated,
“touch and concern” the U.S. with sufficient force to displace the
presumption.
Judge Graves backs his assertions by looking at the political climate
prior to ATS enactment, proving that the ATS was and is not meant to
only apply to a narrow set of situations, operated by a bright line rule.150
He reiterates the concern for foreign relations and cites to Kiobel’s
language that the purpose of the ATS was to address “violations of the
law of nations, admitting of a judicial remedy and, at the same time,
threatening serious consequences in international affairs.” 151 “Prior to
the enactment of the ATS, Congress was frustrated by the federal
government’s incapacity to vindicate rights under the law of nations.”152
Congress’ annoyance with the lack of enforcement power prior to the
ATS’s enactment would not lead them to legislate narrowly. If anything,
this attitude would have led them to desire a broad reading of the statute,
likely a reason why instead of going into detail, they left the statute to
simply state: “the law of nations.”

148. Id. at 216-17.
149. Id. at 208.
150. Congress’ desire to put legislation in place allowing them to deal with international issues
was intensified by the Marbois incident, May 1784. See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111
(1784). Discussed in 542 U.S. 692.
151. 845 F.3d at 210.
152. Id.
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C. A Limitation of the Fourth Circuit’s Analysis
While a multi-factor test to decide an extraterritorial application of
ATS should be the correct analysis for a claim, this test cannot go
without limitation. A major concern that comes with applying the ATS
broadly is the issue of the U.S. having too much police power. If the
U.S. is able to bring those from abroad to the U.S. to try them for
international wrongs against other foreign individuals, controversy
might ignite.
As a result, it would be most beneficial for foreign citizens to be able
to state a cause of action under the ATS for crimes committed in
violation of international law by U.S. citizens or U.S. based
corporations. ATS should be used as an avenue for the U.S. to hold
these citizens and corporations accountable for violations of the laws of
nations occurring in the U.S. and abroad. If a U.S. citizen or corporation
violates the law of nations in another country, either by funneling money
to an organization, person, or operation or by providing personnel to
carry out or instruct others to carry out a violation, they should not have
to be extradited to that country to be held accountable for their actions.
Those, or their family members, who have suffered the violation should
be able to choose a forum when seeking a remedy, and the ATS should
be the vehicle for it.
If the situation is reversed and a U.S. citizen is the victim of a
violation of the law of nations, the line becomes more blurred. One
possible method of redress would be attempting to bring suit abroad, if
possible, to avoid any conflict of laws. If there is no available remedy, a
U.S. citizen, suffering from a violation of the law of nations committed
abroad, should seek an application of the ATS. In the event that a court
would allow a case such a this to proceed, there would need to be some
sort of procedure in place to attempt to avoid conflicting laws, and to
ultimately prevent forum shopping and other potential issues.
While some sort of limitation is necessary on ATS cases, this
limitation should be decided on a case by case basis.153 It is impossible
to foresee all potential issues that may arise in allowing a broad
application of the ATS, but the fear alone should not foreclose plaintiffs
from bringing suit under the statute.
D. Al Shimari Satisfies RJR’s Test
Regardless of whether the Fourth Circuit takes a unique approach to
the extraterritorial component of the ATS by applying a multi-factor
153. Potentially in an analogous fashion to a forum non conviens issue. See Piper v. Reno, 454
U.S. 235 (1981).
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test, the Fourth Circuit still has a case that is, or should be read, to be
compliant with the test last enunciated by the Supreme Court in RJR.
As previously stated it can be said that ATS displaces the
presumption against extraterritoriality by explicitly mentioning in a
statute “the law of nations” or a similar variation. However, even if a
court were to disagree, the court is forced to move to step two of the
RJR test, which looks at what activity occurred domestically and the
extent necessary to allow a case to proceed. Employment and orders
were both directed from the U.S. The fact that the orders and funds were
coming from the U.S. in this scenario should be sufficient to permissibly
apply the ATS. Even if the torture itself was not occurring in the U.S.,
the orders themselves were being directed by U.S. officials, in the U.S.
While the language of ATS is broad, so is the language of RJR’s
enunciated test. A permissible application of the second part of the test
can and should be read to encompass any activity stemming from or
relating to the alleged tortious conduct. The same analysis should be
conducted in Adhikari, and it should come out the same way. In short,
application of the RJR test in both Adhikari and Al Shimari should lead
to a finding of a permissible extraterritorial application of ATS.
E. An ATS Analysis Going Forward
While the Supreme Court has spoken on the presumption against
extraterritoriality generally, and also specifically in terms of the ATS,
there has still been a clear disagreement on what the test is and how it
should be applied. Though the Supreme Court declined to hear Adhikari,
it granted certiorari to Jesner v Arab Bank154 to determine whether
corporations may be held liable under the ATS. The Supreme Court’s
April 2018 decision, however, failed to provide the clarity needed for
the judiciary to more accurately apply the ATS going forward.155 Jesner
provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify whether the
focus of the statute is essentially the only inquiry into whether an ATS
claim can successfully be brought, or whether a multi-factor analysis is
more appropriate, with potential factors including: substantial
connections to the U.S., headquarters based in the U.S., etcetera. A
multi-faceted analysis is a more viable option to consider whether a
claim sufficiently “touch[es] and concern[s]” the U.S. However, the
Supreme Court failed to contemplate a parallel analysis in Jesner.
In Jesner, petitioners argued that the Arab Bank provided financial
services to various terrorist groups, thus allowing for attacks to occur in

154. In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litig., 808 F.3d 144 (2015).
155. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S.Ct. 1386 (2018).
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foreign nations.156 In a 5-4 decision, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, focused the opinion on a history of the ATS and the Court’s
decision in Sosa, before ultimately concluding that the judiciary lacked
the power to find corporate liability within the ATS. Instead, the
majority, again, stated that it is not within the judiciary’s purview to
clarify the scope of the ATS, but rather that the task lies with
Congress.157 Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsberg, Breyer,
and Kagan, dissented, stating that “[t]he text, history, and purpose of the
ATS, as well as the long and consistent history of corporate liability in
tort, confirm that tort law claims for law-of-nations violations may be
brought against corporations under the ATS.”158 The dissenting Justices
correctly realized the danger of failing to recognize corporate liability in
human rights violations cases. Not only would recognizing corporate
liability in human rights violations cases benefit survivors and their
beneficiaries, but by holding banks and corporations liable for their
actions, those banks and corporations are likely to increase the policing
of their customers and are more likely to catch anything out of the
ordinary, before it is too late, in fear of being scolded and/or fined by the
U.S. government. Should the Supreme Court fail to continue to clarify
the application of the ATS, confusion will continue to spread. With the
increased amount of terrorism occurring through the world, it is
important that the Supreme Court come up with a clear answer or even a
viable test for those that have been victims of violations of the law of
nations, occurring outside of the U.S. by U.S. citizens or corporations. If
the Supreme Court voices that the focus of the statute is not the sole test,
many more potential doors open for victims and their families. Rather
than continuing to look at the legislature, the Supreme Court should join
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, revisit the ATS’s application, and deliver a
viable analysis.
The Supreme Court’s finding that corporations cannot be held liable
under the ATS, is not the end-all-be-all of ATS claims. The Supreme
Court’s failure to recognize corporate liability in the ATS context does
not serve as a categorial bar to individuals seeking redress, rather such
individuals must jump over more hurdles to bring suit. While corporate
liability does not exist directly under the ATS, potential litigation is not
foreclosed because the officers and employees of the corporations can
still be held accountable for their actions in an individual or employment
related capacity, making indemnification the probable result.

156. In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d at 149.
157. Jesner, 138 S.Ct. at 1402.
158. Id. at 1419 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Going forward, it would be wise for the Supreme Court to clarify the
test, not only for applying the ATS generally, but for analyzing
extraterritoriality.159 While a multi-factor test is the right path to follow,
it is important to be wary of any potential conflicts of law and the risks
associated with the U.S. over policing international law or the law of
nations–making it important that the Court implement a limitation.
While it is necessary for the Supreme Court to enunciate a bright line
rule when it comes to the extraterritorial application of the ATS, the rule
itself should not be a bright line.

159. One that should be aligned with the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation to yield the statute’s
intended results.
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